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The Parted Paths of School Desegregation
and School Finance Litigation
Goodwin Liu*
I am delighted to be part of this conference on the fiftieth
anniversary of Brown II.1 After the many commemorations of the
fiftieth anniversary of Brown 12 last year, it seems especially
important and commendable that the University of Minnesota
Law School has directed our attention to Brown II. After all, it's
not difficult to affirm and celebrate the accomplishment of Brown
I: the authoritative, unequivocal declaration that state-imposed
racial segregation violates the constitutional rights of Black
schoolchildren. Brown II, however, poses the harder question of
how to make those rights real-how to remedy legal wrongs-in
the untidy crucible of American public schools. On the long road
to racial equality in education, Brown I gave us an enduring
symbol, while Brown II began to address matters of substance.
In the five decades since Brown II, two major legal strategies
have been used in pursuit of the principle that educational
"opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms."3 The
first is school desegregation; the second is school finance reform.
One strategy involves redistributing schoolchildren; the other
involves redistributing money. One focuses on race; the other
focuses on resources. Despite these differences, both are united by
a common purpose of improving educational opportunity for the
most disadvantaged children-in particular, those who are
minority and poor. School desegregation is, of course, a lineal
descendant of Brown. But school finance litigation also lies within
. Assistant Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California, Berkeley. I thank University of Minnesota Law School Dean Alex
Johnson and Associate Dean Jim Chen for inviting me to participate in the
conference "With All Deliberate Speed: Brown II and Desegregation's Children" on
May 5, 2005.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Id. at 493.
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"a continuing progressive legal dynamic" sparked by Brown.4
According to Michael Rebell, one of the nation's top school finance
litigators, the strategy reflects "a renewed attempt to implement
Brown's vision of equal educational opportunity."5
Given their common goal and similar time frame of evolution,
it is somewhat puzzling that school desegregation and school
finance litigation have led largely separate lives in our legal
culture. As Professor James Ryan has observed, "[o]ne can easily
envision how school finance reform and desegregation could have
worked well together to equalize the educational opportunities of
poor and minority children by ensuring that the fate of
disadvantaged students was tied to the fate of their more
advantaged peers."6 Politically, school finance reform is easier to
achieve where its beneficiaries are not segregated by race, 7 and
desegregation is easier to achieve where all schools are amply
resourced.8 Educationally, we know that both resource-dependent
interventions as well as peer and environmental influences have
important effects on learning outcomes, even if the relative
strength of these factors remains unclear. 9
Notwithstanding these points of convergence, school
desegregation and school finance reform are rarely treated
together. Although the plight of poor minority schoolchildren is a
shared point of departure, the two strategies are
compartmentalized in casebooks and commentary, 10 and their
advocates appear to keep each other at a distance. For example,
although court-ordered school desegregation has slowed to a
virtual standstill over the past decade, the NAACP Legal Defense
4. Michael A. Rebell, Adequacy Litigations: A New Path to Equity, in
BRINGING EQUITY BACK: RESEARCH FOR A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL
POLICY 291, 292 (Janice Petrovich & Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2005).
5. Id. at 298.
6. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 259 (1999).
7. See e.g., James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race on School Finance Reform,
98 MICH. L. REv. 432 (1999).
8. This is the intuition underlying the creation of magnet schools for the
purpose of desegregation. For an historical overview, see Christine H. Rossell,
Magnet Schools: No Longer Famous but Still Intact, EDuC. NEXT, Spring 2005, at
44.
9. See infra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW (4th
ed. 2002) (discussing school desegregation in Chapter 4 and school finance
litigation in Chapter 7). Professor Ryan's work exploring the relationship between
desegregation and school finance litigation is an exception in the literature. In
addition to the articles cited in notes 6 and 7 above, see James E. Ryan, Sheff,
Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 529 (1999).
[Vol. 24:81
THE PARTED PATHS
Fund ("LDF") has not embraced school finance litigation as a tool
to improve educational opportunity for minority schoolchildren,
even though such litigation has gained momentum in recent
years. 1' Similarly, school finance reformers have been cool to the
cause of school desegregation from the beginning. 12
How did this disconnect come about? Today I'd like to
explore this question through an historical lens, focusing on a
particular moment when school desegregation and school finance
reform crossed paths at the United States Supreme Court. The
year was 1973, and the Court was confronting two major
educational equity cases: San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez13 and Keyes v. School District No. 1.14 The two cases
were argued on the same day, October 12, 1972,15 and they were
decided exactly three months apart, Rodriguez on March 21, 1973,
and Keyes on June 21, 1973. In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged a
denial of equal protection to minority students who were poor and
racially segregated. 16  In both cases, the aggrieved students
included not only Black but also Hispanic schoolchildren. 17
Although we typically put Keyes and Rodriguez into separate
categories as a matter of doctrine and policy, I will argue that the
boundary between these two cases, as they reached the Court in
the October 1972 Term, was actually quite blurry. Keyes and
Rodriguez presented common questions concerning equality of
educational opportunity that were a source of both symmetry and
11. See Rebell, supra note 4, at 297 ("Plaintiffs [in school finance suits]
prevailed in the vast majority (18 of 29) of the major decisions of the highest state
courts since 1989.").
12. See JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION xvii-
xviii (1970) ("[T]o suppose that integration would itself produce equality of
education is plainly naive."); Ryan, supra note 10, at 532 n.14 ("School finance
litigation began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, at a time when the slow pace of
desegregation was causing some civil rights activists to question the efficacy of
desegregation as a tool to improve the educational opportunities of minority
students.").
13. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
14. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
15. See 77 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1975) (Keyes oral argument transcript); 76 id. at 571 (Rodriguez oral
argument transcript).
16. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 189; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 5-6.
17. Keyes determined that "schools with a combined predominance of Negroes
and Hispanos" are properly regarded as "segregated' schools," 413 U.S. at 198, and
Rodriguez involved a poor school district whose student body was 90% Mexican-
American and over 6% Black, 411 U.S. at 12.
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tension between the cases. The Court's resolution of those
questions set school desegregation and school finance reform apart
from each other. The former was held to involve justiciable racial
discrimination; the latter was held to involve nonjusticiable
educational policy. Yet this was not how the two cases arrived
from the lower courts, and the point I wish to make today is that
Keyes and Rodriguez, though now distinct and compartmentalized,
presented the Court with an opportunity to synthesize the law of
school desegregation and school finance reform into a unified
doctrine of equal educational opportunity. Regrettably, the Court
declined this opportunity in 1973.
Part I of this Essay tells the tale of Keyes and Rodriguez,
highlighting the relationship between the two cases and the way
the Court set them apart. Part II characterizes the Court's 1977
decision in Milliken 1118 as a half-step down the road not taken in
1973. Finally, Part III affirms the continuing need to bring school
desegregation and school finance reform under a common principle
of equal educational opportunity. Part III also briefly discusses
two Connecticut Supreme Court decisions, Horton v. Meskill' 9 and
Sheff v. O'Neill,20 that demonstrate how school desegregation and
school finance reform can be synthesized.
I. A Tale of Two Cases: Keyes and Rodriguez
Keyes and Rodriguez arrived at the Supreme Court from
different doctrinal paths. Keyes was the first major case to test
whether the desegregation principles announced two years earlier
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education would
apply not only to Southern school districts with long histories of de
jure segregation, 21 but also to school districts in the North and
West where, despite state laws prohibiting segregation, racially
identifiable schools persisted as a result of residential migration
and school board actions. 22 Rodriguez, on the other hand, was not
framed as a race case. The plaintiffs invoked Brown not for what
18. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
19. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
20. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
21. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971)
(establishing a presumption of unconstitutional discrimination "against schools...
substantially disproportionate in their racial composition").
22. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 191 ("[The Denver] system has never been operated
under a constitutional or statutory provision that mandated or permitted racial
segregation in public education.")
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it said about racial discrimination, but for what it said about the
importance of education. 23 Because of its intimate connection to
political participation, education was thought to implicate a
fundamental interest that the state must provide evenhandedly
absent compelling justification to do otherwise. 24 Further, the
plaintiffs presented Rodriguez as the next logical step in a line of
cases where the Court had vindicated claims of discrimination
against poor people in settings other than education. 25
Despite these differences, Keyes and Rodriguez, as they
emerged from the lower courts, presented similar issues of
unequal educational opportunity that blurred the boundary
between school desegregation and school finance litigation. As
discussed below, the two cases had an important symmetry in
their approaches to liability, but also an important tension in their
perspectives on remedy. By resolving these issues as it did, the
Supreme Court missed an opportunity to draw school
desegregation and school finance litigation closer together
doctrinally and instead pushed them apart.
A. Keyes's Convergence with Rodriguez
Let me begin with Keyes. The case involved racial
segregation in two regions of the sprawling Denver school district.
One region was the Park Hill neighborhood in northeast Denver.
There, "the District Court found that 'Ib]etween 1960 and 1969 the
Board's policies ... show an undeviating purpose to isolate Negro
students' in segregated schools 'while preserving the Anglo
character of [other] schools."' 26 The policies included segregative
manipulation of attendance boundaries and deliberate
23. See Brief for Appellees at 26-27, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332) (quoting Brown !'s famous passage that begins
"[tioday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments....").
24. Rodriguez thus involved values similar to those at stake in Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (invalidating state election law that gave established
political parties an advantage over new parties), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964) (invalidating state malapportionment of electoral districts).
25. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating state residency
requirement for receipt of welfare benefits); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll tax); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(upholding a criminal defendant's right to counsel regardless of ability to pay);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (upholding a criminal defendant's right to trial
transcript necessary for appeal regardless of ability to pay).
26. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 198-99 (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp.
289, 294 (D. Colo. 1969)).
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concentration of minority teachers in minority schools.27 There
was little doubt about the School Board's liability for intentional
discrimination in Park Hill and the need for desegregation as a
remedy.
The second and, for our purposes, more interesting region
was the core city area of Denver, where residential segregation
together with neighborhood attendance zones had created and
maintained racially identifiable schools. 28 The central issue in
Keyes was what liability the School Board faced with respect to
these schools, whose segregation was arguably de facto, not de
jure. The Supreme Court resolved this issue by establishing a
presumption that the segregation in the core city resulted from the
same discriminatory intent as the segregation in Park Hill.29 In
doing so, the Court all but ensured that de jure violations would be
found in both areas, whereupon "the District Court must, as in the
case of Park Hill, decree all-out desegregation of the core city
schools."30 This outcome fulfilled the plaintiffs' goal of securing a
system-wide desegregation remedy. 31
Given this result, what, if anything, did Keyes have to do with
Rodriguez? Answering this question requires a close look at the
record in Keyes, with attention to how the district court originally
addressed the issue of segregation in the core city schools. In their
complaint, the plaintiffs, represented by LDF, gave three reasons
why segregation in the core city was unconstitutional. First, they
alleged that the School Board had purposefully created segregated
schools through boundary changes, school site selection, and a
neighborhood school policy. 32 Second, they argued that the Board's
neighborhood school policy, even if adopted with no discriminatory
27. See Keyes, 303 F. Supp. at 290-95; Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp.
279, 284-85 (D. Colo. 1969).
28. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 198-202.
29. See id. at 208 ([A] finding of intentionally segregative school board actions
in a meaningful portion of a school system.., creates a presumption that other
segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious.").
30. Id. at 214.
31. On remand, the district court found that the intentional segregation
demonstrated in Park Hill rendered the entire Denver system an
unconstitutionally segregated system, see Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 368 F. Supp.
207, 210 (D. Colo. 1973), and the court adopted a system-wide desegregation plan,
see Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974). On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of system-wide liability and
upheld the court's desegregative student assignment and transportation plan. See
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 484 (10th Cir. 1975).
32. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 63-64 (D. Colo. 1970).
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intent, was unconstitutional so long as it produced segregation in
fact. 33 Third, they contended that the high-minority core city
schools, whether de jure or de facto segregated, were inferior and
provided unequal educational opportunity-a condition failing to
meet even the "separate but equal" standard of Plessy v. Ferguson
and requiring a remedy regardless of its cause. 34
As to the second argument, the district court declined to hold
that segregation arising from a non-racially motivated
neighborhood school policy is by itself unconstitutional.35 The
court adhered to the now-familiar rule that racial segregation is
unlawful only if it is the result of segregative intent. 36 As to the
plaintiffs' first argument, the district court acknowledged that
various zoning and site selection decisions by the School Board
had increased the minority concentration at certain core city
schools.37 However, the court was not convinced that those
decisions were motivated by a segregative purpose rather than
considerations of school capacity. 38 Equally important, the court
found the evidence insufficient to establish a causal connection
between School Board decisions and current patterns of
segregation. Observing that the purportedly segregative School
Board actions occurred in the 1950s, "at an earlier date [than the
actions concerning Park Hill] and, in some instances, prior to the
Brown decision,"39 the district court said that "much of the [racial]
concentration [in the core city schools] occurred long after these
decisions were made."4 0 According to the court, "the complained of
acts are remote in time and do not loom large when assessing fault
or cause. The impact of the housing patterns and neighborhood
population movement stand out as the actual culprits."4'
Thus, the district court refused to find core city segregation to
be unconstitutional either on a de facto theory (because legally
33. See id. at 64.
34. See id. at 63-64, 69-83 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
35. See id. at 76-77.
36. See Keyes, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) ("We emphasize that the differentiating
factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation... is purpose
or intent to segregate."); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976)
(establishing discriminatory intent as the touchstone of unconstitutional
discrimination).
37. See Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 75-76.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 69.




insufficient) or on a de jure theory (because factually insufficient).
This point is important. It means that the district court did not
see the problem facing the core city schools as a problem of
unlawful racial discrimination.
Instead, the district court accepted the plaintiffs' third
argument that unequal provision of educational opportunity to the
students in racially identifiable core city schools violates the
Constitution. In finding unconstitutional inequality, the court
compared the segregated core city schools with predominantly
White schools and with district-wide averages on five measures. 42
Three were educational inputs (teacher experience, teacher
turnover, and school facilities), and the other two were educational
outcomes (student achievement and dropout rates). In each
instance, the court compiled data, including four pages of
statistical appendices, showing that students in high-minority core
city schools received an inferior education. 43  For example,
whereas 23.9% of teachers had no previous experience, 48.6% were
on probation, and 17.4% had ten or more years of experience in
minority elementary schools, only 9.8% had no previous
experience, 25.6% were on probation, and 47.1% had ten or more
years of experience in predominantly White elementary schools. 44
Student achievement data for elementary, junior high, and senior
high schools revealed substantial gaps between predominantly
minority schools and district-wide norms. 45  Additional data
showed that students at predominantly minority junior and senior
high schools dropped out at rates many times higher than their
peers at predominantly White schools.46
The fact of racial segregation did enter into the court's
analysis of educational inequality. Drawing on expert testimony
and independent studies,47 the court determined that "segregation,
regardless of its cause, is a major factor in producing inferior
42. See id. at 78-81, 86-89.
43. See id. at 86-89.
44. See id. at 79-80. The court went on to explain that seniority-based teacher
transfer policies "creat[ed] a much higher turnover rate at predominantly minority
schools than at predominantly Anglo schools," resulting in a higher percentage of
inexperienced teachers at minority schools. Id. at 80.
45. See id. at 78-79, 86.
46. See id. at 89.
47. See id. at 81-82 (relying on expert testimony of New York University
education professor Dan Dodson and findings of the Special Study Committee on
Equality of Educational Opportunity in the Denver Public Schools).
[Vol. 24:81
THE PARTED PATHS
schools -and unequal educational opportunity."48 But here the
district court understood segregation to be relevant not as a free-
standing legal harm but as a contributing source of educational
harm. In other words, segregation was problematic not in and of
itself, but because it compromised the substantive quality of
education at high-minority schools. 49
Although the district court saw segregation as a key factor in
producing inequality, it did not believe that the answer entailed
desegregation as opposed to compensatory educational measures.
In its preliminary discussion of appropriate remedies, the court
proposed several "equalizing" strategies for the parties to consider:
renovating core city school buildings, prohibiting teachers with
seniority from transferring to superior schools, and paying
teachers "premium salaries" to teach in high-minority schools.5 0
While encouraging the parties to develop a school improvement
program with these and other components, the court was much
less supportive of busing: "In connection with equalizing the
educational opportunity, it is not so clear that compulsory
transportation is the answer."51
At this point in the story, it is evident that Keyes and
Rodriguez presented an interesting convergence. By shifting the
target of equal protection concern from racial segregation to
substantive educational inequality, the district court in Keyes
advanced a theory that began to shade into the kind of claims
being tested in Rodriguez. The court's empirical analysis
resembled the very arguments made by the Rodriguez plaintiffs to
establish unconstitutional inequality in school finance. Indeed,
the Rodriguez plaintiffs claimed that, under the Texas school
funding system, poorer districts had higher teacher turnover,
poorer teacher quality, worse school facilities, lower student
achievement, and higher dropout rates.5 2 Moreover, the legal
48. Id. at 82.
49. The district court seemed aware that its equal protection theory, though
sensitive to the role of racial segregation in producing substantive educational
inequality, had applicability beyond the context of segregated schools. See id. at 83
("'Theoretically,... purely irrational inequalities even between two schools in a
culturally homogeneous, uniformly white suburb would raise a real constitutional
question.'" (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), affd
sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969))).
50. Id. at 84.
51. Id. The court qualified this statement by acknowledging that "it is
conceivable that [busing] could become the only effective remedy as a matter of
law." Id. at 85.
52. See Brief for Appellees at 20-22, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
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principle stated by the district court in Keyes-that "if the school
board chooses not to take positive steps to alleviate de facto
segregation, it must at a minimum ensure that its schools offer an
equal educational opportunity"53-seemed equally applicable to
the state of Texas as it was to the Denver School Board. In
addition, the Keyes court centered the remedy issue on what was
necessary not to cure racial segregation per se, but to provide
substantive equality in educational opportunity. Substantive
equality, the court suggested, might require better facilities, better
teachers, and more resources-the sorts of educational inputs
sought by the plaintiffs in Rodriguez-but not necessarily
desegregation. 54  Thus, the Keyes litigation had noticeable
similarities with Rodriguez in doctrinal, evidentiary, and remedial
dimensions. But the symmetry soon gave way to a pointed
tension.
B. Keyes's Divergence from Rodriguez
Going into the remedial stage, the plaintiffs in Keyes had
prevailed on one of their theories of liability concerning the core
city schools. But the theory, as interpreted by the district court,
did not automatically entail the remedy they wanted most:
system-wide desegregation. To obtain that remedy, the plaintiffs
set out to make a factual showing that system-wide desegregation
was essential to equalizing school quality. Predictably, the School
Board took the opposing view that equalization could occur
through a program of compensatory education-including
incentives for good teachers to work in core city schools, early child
development initiatives, teacher training, and various forms of
academic enrichment-"with little emphasis on desegregation." 55
Thus the issue was joined:
The crucial factual issue considered [at the remedial
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332). State-court successors to the Rodriguez plaintiffs
have taken a similar empirical approach in challenging state school finance
systems. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 801 N.E.2d 326, 333-40
(N.Y. 2003).
53. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 83. The district court in Keyes cited Griffin and
Douglas, two of the key cases relied on by the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, in declaring
that "where state action, even if non-discriminatory on its face, results in the
unequal treatment of the poor or a minority group as a class, the action is
unconstitutional unless the state provides a substantial justification in terms of
legitimate state interest." Id. at 82 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 n.11
(1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)).
54. See id. at 82-83.
55. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 90, 93 (D. Colo. 1970).
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stage] was whether compensatory education alone in a
segregated setting is capable of bringing about the necessary
equalizing effects or whether desegregation and integration
are essential to improving the schools in question and
providing equality. The evidence of both parties [was] directed
to this question.5 6
Here is where Keyes and Rodriguez were drawn into tension.
In Keyes, the plaintiffs sought to show not only "that desegregation
is essential in improving the quality of educational opportunity in
the [core city] schools," but also its negative corollary: "that
compensatory programs of the type proposed by the defendants
cannot work in a segregated setting."57 Three experts testified for
the plaintiffs on this point. First, Dr. James Coleman, author of
the famed Coleman Report,58 explained that "isolation of children
from low socioeconomic families creates an atmosphere which
inevitably results in an inferior educational opportunity."59
Second, Dr. Neil Sullivan, a former superintendent who had
implemented a desegregation plan in Berkeley, California,
testified that
Berkeley had attempted to improve racially segregated
schools by massive programs of compensatory education
including lowering the teacher-pupil ratio, improving
equipment and materials, and instituting cultural enrichment
programs. These programs had little effect on student
achievement. It was Dr. Sullivan's expert opinion that any
effort at compensatory education must be correlated with
desegregation if it is to achieve positive results.60
Third, the plaintiffs relied on Dr. Robert O'Reilly, a New York
State Department of Education researcher who had conducted "the
most extensive study of compensatory education programs on a
national scale currently available."61 Dr. O'Reilly reported that
"most compensatory education programs include such items as
lowering teacher-pupil ratio, use of paraprofessionals, inservice
teacher and staff training programs, individualized tutoring and
cultural enrichment courses."62 Based on his study, he concluded
that these activities "carried on in a segregated atmosphere had
56. Id. at 94.
57. Id.
58. See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).






little or no effect on raising achievement."63
Although the School Board presented testimony on
enrichment programs already underway in Denver, 64 the district
court found the plaintiffs' evidence "overwhelming. '" 65 Persuaded
by the importance of peer effects on student learning,66 the court
backtracked from its earlier views on remedy and concluded that
"[t]o seek to carry out a compensatory education program within
minority schools without simultaneously developing a program of
desegregation and integration has been unsuccessful. Experience
has shown that money spent in these programs has failed to
produce results and has been, therefore, wasted."67 This factual
conclusion paved the way for the district court to order
desegregation of the core city schools, together with compensatory
programs implemented in a desegregated context.68
It is hard not to notice a conflict here with the position
advanced by the plaintiffs in Rodriguez. A principal theme of the
Rodriguez litigation was that additional resources, presumably
spent on compensatory programs, do make a difference in
improving educational quality, even in intensely segregated
schools like those in the 96% minority Edgewood district. Indeed,
the plaintiffs in Rodriguez insisted on the efficacy of precisely the
types of educational inputs-lower teacher-pupil ratios, better
teacher quality, improved school facilities-that the plaintiffs and
district court in Keyes described as ineffective in segregated
schools. 69 The district court in Rodriguez held in favor of the
63. Id.
64. See id. at 95 (commenting on existing inservice trainings for educators and
vocational training programs).
65. Id. at 96; see also id. (describing plaintiffs' experts as "authorities in the
field" and their opinions as "supported by extensive, comprehensive, in depth
studies and, in some instances, actual experience in the field").
66. The court noted:
The minority citizens are products, in many instances, of parents who
received inferior educations and hence the home environment ... yields
virtually no educational value. Thus, the only hope for raising the level of
these students and for providing them the equal education which the
Constitution guarantees is to bring them into contact with classroom
associates who can contribute to the learning process; it is now clear that
the quality and effectiveness of the education process is dependent on the
presence within the classroom of knowledgeable fellow students.
Id. at 96-97.
67. Id. at 97.
68. See id. at 97-98 ("The ideal approach, and that which offers maximum
promise of success, is a program of desegregation and integration coupled with
compensatory education.").
69. Compare Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 96-97 with Brief for Appellees at 20-21, San
[Vol. 24:81
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plaintiffs without explicitly addressing the relationship between
resources and educational quality.70 But, as the Supreme Court
observed in Rodriguez, "an assumed correlation [between
resources and quality] underl[ies] virtually every legal conclusion
drawn by the District Court in this case."71
Thus, when Keyes and Rodriguez reached the Court in the
October 1972 Term, there was an evident contradiction between
the essential premise of the district court's desegregation order in
Keyes and the essential premise of the district court's order
invalidating the school finance system in Rodriguez.72
C. Race, Resources, and Resolution
Although it is unclear whether the Justices actually noticed,
it seems unlikely that the symmetry and tension between Keyes
and Rodriguez could have eluded the careful study undertaken by
the Court in important cases such as these. How might these
issues have affected the Court's disposition of the two cases?
In Rodriguez, the question whether resources matter to
educational quality was a major preoccupation for all sides,
garnering repeated attention from Justices in the majority and
dissent.73 In lengthy footnotes, the Court cited the emerging mass
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332).
70. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
71. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 43 (1973).
72. The LDF, which represented the plaintiffs in Keyes, filed an amicus brief in
support of the plaintiffs in Rodriguez. See Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332) [hereinafter LDF
Brief]. In the slim 18-page submission, LDF's main argument was that the Texas
school finance system was racially discriminatory and thus unconstitutional. See
id. at 7 ("Plaintiffs are all Mexican-Americans. They claimed relief as and for
Mexican Americans."). Although the LDF Brief said that the plaintiffs' "claim
based on race was specifically upheld" by the district court, id. at 7-8, the district
court's opinion in Rodriguez does not seem to support this statement. See
Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280. The LDF Brief also argued that the Texas scheme
unconstitutionally discriminated against the poor. See LDF Brief, supra, at 8-12.
While trying hard to frame the case as one involving discrimination against a
suspect class, the brief said little to support the claim that resource disparities
produce substantive inequality in educational opportunity. See id. at 14 ("[TIhe
money differences proved by plaintiffs in this case are material enough to warrant
judicial intervention in light of their relationship to the other factors present,
including race and poverty."); id. at 6 n.2, 14 n.8 (affirming generally that money
matters to educational opportunity and outcomes).
73. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23-24, 42-43, 46-47 n.101 (commenting on the
"unsettled and disputed" nature of the issue of whether a connection exists between
expenditure and educational quality); id. at 82-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
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of social science literature on the topic74 and observed that "few
empirical data... support the advantage of any particular pupil-
teacher ratio or... document the existence of a dependable
correlation between the level of public school teachers' salaries and
the quality of their classroom instruction."75 The district court's
findings in Keyes could have only added to the doubt. There the
court said that additional investment in poor minority schools
would, absent desegregation, be "wasted."7 6
Ultimately, the majority in Rodriguez took no firm stance on
the issue, calling it a "major source[] of controversy"77 and an
"unsettled and disputed question."78 That, however, was all the
Court needed to say in order to legitimize a posture of judicial
restraint. If the Court could not be sure that increased investment
in segregated schools such as Edgewood's would produce results,
then there was little practical reason to invalidate the existing
state systems of school finance throughout the country. More
fundamentally, if additional resources could not guarantee
educational improvement, then how could deprivation of resources
form the basis of an equal protection violation? Pleading
uncertainty as to the educational significance of school funding
disparities, the Court characterized the plaintiffs' claim as
untenably insisting on "absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages." 9 In the end, although the Court refrained from
saying that additional resources would not make a difference
educationally, the district court's conclusion to that effect in Keyes
could only have served to validate the Court's uncertainty.
With Rodriguez decided the way it was, the Court in Keyes
was in no position to endorse the district court's approach to the
case. Having declined to decide the cost-quality controversy in
Rodriguez, the Court in Keyes could not then affirm the inefficacy
of compensatory programs and declare the necessity of core city
desegregation on educational grounds. Even more importantly, by
rejecting the plaintiffs' equal protection claim in Rodriguez in
broad doctrinal terms, the Court effectively foreclosed the theory of
(arguing that despite disagreements about the correlation between resources and
educational quality, increased per pupil funding unquestionably leads to "greater
choice in educational planning").
74. See id. at 43 n.86.
75. Id. at 46 n.101.
76. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 90, 97 (D. Colo. 1970).
77. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42-43.
78. Id. at 23.
79. Id. at 24.
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liability in Keyes that focused on unequal educational opportunity
instead of de jure or de facto segregation. Recall that Rodriguez
and Keyes, as they reached the Supreme Court, were cut from the
same equal protection cloth. The district court in Keyes, like the
plaintiffs in Rodriguez, had relied on strong evidence of
educational inequality to establish constitutional liability. After
the Court's decision in Rodriguez, however, educational inequality
by itself was no longer a sufficient basis for imposing remedial
obligations on either the state of Texas or the Denver school
district.
Yet the Court in Keyes was unwilling to leave segregation in
Denver's core city schools intact.8 0 Just two years earlier, in
Swann, the Court had condemned a similar pattern of
residentially-based school segregation in the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg school system and had approved busing as a
remedy.81 An opposite result in Keyes would have left the Court
vulnerable to criticism that it had employed a double standard
between the South and the rest of the country, especially since
public schools in the North and West were (and still are) more
racially segregated.8 2 The Court's solution was to salvage the
theory of liability rejected by the district court and also by the
Tenth Circuit-namely, that core city segregation was the result of
intentionally discriminatory School Board actions. The Court took
80. Before Keyes arrived at the Court, the Tenth Circuit had reversed the
district court's determination that unequal educational opportunity in the core city
schools violated the Constitution while affirming that segregation in those schools
was not the result of segregative intent, thereby absolving the School Board of all
liability in that part of the district. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990,
1004-07 (10th Cir. 1971).
81. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
82. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("There is segregation in the schools of
many of these [northern] cities fully as pervasive as that in southern cities prior to
the desegregation decrees of the past decade and a half. The focus of the school
desegregation problem has now shifted from the South to the country as a whole.").
Justice Powell also noted:
According to the 1971 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) estimate, 43.9% of Negro pupils attended majority White schools in
the South as opposed to only 27.8% who attended such schools in the
North and West. Fifty-seven percent of all Negro pupils in the North and
West attend schools with over 80% minority population as opposed to
32.2% who do so in the South.
Id. at 218 n.3 (citation omitted). Today, segregation continues to be less intense in
the South than in other parts of the nation. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM?




this step on the ground that the lower courts had improperly
ignored the probative value of the plaintiffs' proof of intentional
segregation in Park Hill.83 By deploying a presumption of
segregative intent to facilitate a finding of de jure segregation, the
Court achieved two things: It steered clear of the cost-quality
debate that it had left unsettled in Rodriguez, and it brought
Northern school desegregation doctrine in line with the doctrine
applicable to the South.
Thus, the tension between Keyes and Rodriguez did not
compel the Court to take a position on whether compensatory
resources make a difference in poor minority schools. Instead, it
bolstered one of the prudential reasons for the Court's decision in
Rodriguez to stay out of school finance reform.8 4 The symmetry
between the two cases did not yield a nascent doctrine of
unconstitutional educational inequality. Given Rodriguez's
rejection of this possibility, the Court reframed Keyes as a case
involving de jure segregation, not substantive inequality in
educational opportunity. As a result, the Court in 1973 drove a
wedge between school desegregation and school finance litigation,
holding the latter to implicate issues beyond the competence of
courts to resolve, and focusing the former on racial, not
educational, inequality and on racial, not educational, remedies.
D. Educational Inequality in the Aftermath
Interestingly, this cleavage became explicit in Keyes itself as
the litigation went forward. On remand, the district court adopted
a district-wide busing plan and ordered bilingual education
programs to help Chicano students learn English.85 On appeal,
83. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 206-08.
84. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41-43 (1973)
(stating that school finance reform involves matters of fiscal and educational policy
on which "this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels
against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and
local levels"); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1978)
("[Institutional concerns significantly informed the Court's view that the equal
protection clause was not violated by Texas' system of financing public schools
largely through local property taxation.").
85. Applying the presumption of de jure segregation established by the
Supreme Court's decision in Keyes, the district court on remand concluded that the
Denver School Board had maintained an unconstitutional dual system, see Keyes v.
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 368 F. Supp. 207, 209-10 (D. Colo. 1973), that called for busing and
bilingual education remedies, see Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673, 689-
94 (D. Colo. 1974).
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the Tenth Circuit upheld the busing plan but not the bilingual
programs.8 6 Quoting Rodriguez, the Tenth Circuit explained that
the bilingual programs exceeded the district court's remedial
authority partly because they implicated "[elducational policy,...
an area in which the courts' 'lack of specialized knowledge and
experience counsels against premature interference with the
informed judgments made at state and local levels."'87 Relying
further on Rodriguez, the Tenth Circuit held that, because
"education is not a right protected by the Constitution,"8 8 "the
school's alleged failure to adapt to the cultural and economic needs
of minority students [does not] amount to a violation of the
fourteenth amendment."89
Three years after Rodriguez and Keyes, former LDF staff
attorney and then Harvard law professor Derrick Bell observed:
The espousal of educational improvement as the
appropriate goal of school desegregation efforts is out of phase
with the current state of the law. Largely through the efforts
of civil rights lawyers, most courts have come to construe
Brown v. Board of Education as mandating "equal educational
opportunities" through school desegregation plans aimed at
achieving racial balance, whether or not those plans will
improve the education received by the children affected.90
Marshaling the sentiments of Black leaders in Atlanta, Boston,
and other communities who "wished to place greater emphasis on
upgrading the schools' educational quality,"91 Bell provocatively
argued that "racial balance may not be the relief actually desired
by the victims of segregated schools."92  "Low academic
performance and large numbers of disciplinary and expulsion
cases,"93 he explained, were among the harmful consequences of
insisting that "black children are entitled to integrated schools
without regard to the educational effects of such assignments." 94
86. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 481 (10th Cir. 1975).
87. Id. at 482 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42).
88. Id. (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-37).
89. Id. at 483 (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 39).
90. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976).
91. Id. at 482.
92. Id. at 472.
93. Id. at 488.
94. Id. at 480. Professor Bell eventually took the position that Brown might
have achieved more for the cause of equal educational opportmuity over the past
half-century had it required rigorous enforcement of Plessy's "separate but equal"
standard instead of declaring segregation unconstitutional. See DERRICK BELL,
SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES
20061
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Bell's concerns echoed those of early school finance reformers who
were skeptical of integration as a strategy for educational equality:
Integration is indeed a sound, long-run prescription for
many of the basic ailments of education and of our society-so
long as we don't, in the meantime, die of something else; but to
suppose that integration would itself produce equality of
education is plainly naive .... Not only will quality education
for all children not be guaranteed by integration, but there is
danger that a holy war with this single objective will produce a
Pyrrhic victory by neglecting and obscuring other important
forms of discrimination in education against both white and
black.95
Bell's negative assessment of desegregation has been
controversial, and, coming in the mid-1970s, it was perhaps
premature. Despite the lapse of twenty years since Brown,
desegregation was still in its early stages in many communities.
Best practices had yet to emerge, and research on educational
outcomes had many methodological problems and focused
narrowly on short-term gains. 96 Had the courts and political
leaders after Keyes championed desegregation as a national
priority, opposition to desegregation might have ebbed to a degree
that would have allowed the project to succeed. However, at the
time of his writing, Bell was correct that the doctrine emerging
from Keyes and Rodriguez "fail[ed] to encompass the complexity of
achieving equal educational opportunity for children to whom it so
long ha[d] been denied."97  Although desegregation, where
possible, was an important component of equality-promoting
reform, "too little attention ha[d] been given to making [minority]
schools educationally effective."9g  This predicament followed
directly from the Court's failure in 1973 to assimilate school
desegregation and school finance into a broader theory of equal
educational opportunity.
II. Race and Resources Revisited: Milliken II
Would Keyes have turned out differently had it not arisen
together with Rodriguez? Perhaps not. Although Rodriguez
FOR RACIAL REFORM 20-27 (2004).
95. COONS ET AL., supra note 12, at xvii-xviii.
96. See Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, The Effects of Research Methodology
on Desegregation-Achievement Studies: A Meta-Analysis, 88 AM. J. SOC. 839, 847
(1983).
97. Bell, supra note 90, at 478.
98. Id. at 479.
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precluded the Court in Keyes from endorsing the district court's
attempt to frame the problem of segregation in educational terms,
the Court might well have treated Keyes as a racial, not
educational, discrimination case in any event. As suggested above,
the patterns of segregation in Denver and Charlotte-Mecklenburg
implicated similar degrees of school board complicity. Accordingly,
the Court in Keyes saw fit to adapt its existing theory of liability in
Swann to the circumstances of the North and West rather than
embark on a new theory as the district court and Justice Powell
would have done.99 Moreover, a district-wide busing remedy was
equally available in Denver as it was in Charlotte-Mecklenburg.
Nevertheless, the Court soon found a limit to the pursuit of
racial balance in school desegregation and infused its doctrine
with more explicitly educational concerns. One year after Keyes,
the Court in Milliken I lost its appetite for Northern school
desegregation when faced with the prospect of busing across
district lines in order to desegregate the predominantly Black
Detroit school system.10 0 The problem of racially segregated
districts, not merely racially segregated schools, produced an
important doctrinal shift between 1974 and 1977.
Given the futility of intradistrict busing in Detroit, Milliken
II upheld a wide-ranging remedial education plan that included a
reading program, comprehensive teacher training,
nondiscriminatory testing, and counseling and career guidance.10 '
While continuing to identify de jure segregation as the "condition
that offends the Constitution,"102 the Court in Milliken II-like the
district court in Keyes-took a step toward redefining segregation
as a problem of unequal educational opportunity and reorienting
remedies toward educational outcomes. The goal, according to the
99. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 219-36 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (urging abandonment of the de jure/de
facto distinction and adoption of a uniform national standard for desegregation
obligations).
100. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
101. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 275-77, 279-88 (1977). The full plan,
comprised of 12 educational components, is described in Bradley v. Milliken, 402
F. Supp. 1096, 1134-45 (E.D. Mich. 1975). Although intradistrict busing was part
of the remedial plan, the most it could practically achieve was the elimination of
identifiably White schools in Detroit, not identifiably Black schools. See id. at
1134-38. In the 2000-01 school year, Black students comprised 91% of the
enrollment in Detroit public schools. See FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 82, at 54
tbl. 19.




Court, was "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the
position they would have enjoyed in terms of education."10 3
Moreover, by upholding an order requiring the state to pay half
the costs of the remedial plan's major elements,10 4 Milliken 11
channeled additional resources to minority schools where racial
balance could not be achieved through intradistrict busing. In this
way, Milliken II served as a partial surrogate for the outcome not
achieved in Rodriguez.
Thus, Milliken II can be viewed as a half-step down the road
not taken in 1973 in two senses. While continuing to treat dejure
segregation as the core violation, the Court focused the remedy on
improving educational quality. And while recognizing the
importance of new resources to improving educational quality, the
Court now left racial balance out of the equation.
Given this "educational" turn in desegregation doctrine, it is
interesting to imagine how Rodriguez might have turned out had
it reached the Court not with Keyes in 1973, but with Milliken H in
1977. The Court's uninhibited engagement with educational
policy beyond pupil assignment might have provided a more
favorable backdrop for consideration of Rodriguez. Consider this
passage in Milliken II:
Children who have been.., educationally and culturally
set apart from the larger community will inevitably acquire
habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes reflecting their
cultural isolation. They are likely to acquire speech habits, for
example, which vary from the environment in which they must
ultimately function and compete, if they are to enter and be a
part of that community. This is not peculiar to race; in this
setting, it can affect any children who, as a group, are isolated
by force of law from the mainstream. Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974).
Pupil assignment alone does not automatically remedy
the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the
consequences linger and can be dealt with only by independent
measures. In short, speech habits acquired in a segregated
system do not vanish simply by moving the child to a
desegregated school. The root condition shown by this record
must be treated directly by special training at the hands of
teachers prepared for that task. 0 5
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. See id. at 288-91.
105. Id. at 287-88. Although the Court's fixation on "speech habits" has a
somewhat impertinent ring, I think the term can be read as a proxy for the broad
array of learning disadvantages that result from educational and cultural isolation.
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Here the Court did not assume a posture of skepticism or
agnosticism toward the efficacy of "independent measures" (i.e.,
remedial programs) that "treat] directly" the "root condition" of
educational and cultural isolation. Instead, the Court was telling
the unlawfully segregated Black schoolchildren of Detroit that
compensatory resources, and not interdistrict busing, would be
effective in making them educationally whole. Had Rodriguez
arisen at the same time, wouldn't it have been difficult for the
Court to question the educational efficacy of similar compensatory
resources for the Hispanic and Black children of poor school
districts like Edgewood?
But this is not to say that the result in Rodriguez would
necessarily have been different in 1977 than in 1973. Despite its
educational thrust, the remedy in Milliken II was still premised on
a finding of racial discrimination, which was absent in Rodriguez.
My point is simply that one of the key issues running through
Rodriguez-whether additional resources matter to educational
quality-was clearly tipped to one side by the Court's remedial
approach in Milliken I. If compensatory programs would benefit
culturally isolated minority schoolchildren in Detroit, then surely
they would benefit culturally isolated minority schoolchildren in
San Antonio as well.
Had Rodriguez been considered with Milliken II, the Court
could not easily have invoked uncertainty about the relationship
between resources and quality in rejecting the Equal Protection
claim (although it could have relied on other reasons). In
authorizing district courts to order compensatory resources as a
remedy for segregation, Milliken II presupposed the educational
efficacy of such resources in segregated schools. This would have
forced a more candid appraisal in Rodriguez of the disparities in
educational quality between well-resourced and poorly-resourced
school districts. As it was, the Court saw fit to doubt the
educational significance of such disparities in Rodriguez and to
suggest misleadingly that the only grievance at stake was a denial
of "absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." 106
III. Sheff and Synthesis
Fifty years after Brown II, school desegregation-both racial
balancing under Keyes and remedial programs under Milliken II-
has all but come to an end. Meanwhile, school finance reform
106. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
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continues apace in state courts, with notable successes in recent
years. The two strategies remain largely separate in theory and in
practice.
Yet the dual imperatives of reallocating students and
reallocating resources linger, as public school segregation by race
and poverty persists and, in many areas, worsens.10 7 Whereas the
Court in 1973 moved forward with racial integration while leaving
resource redistribution behind, today we appear to be pursuing the
opposite strategy. Four decades after the Coleman Report, we
have better evidence that additional resources can enhance
educational quality when spent in the right places on the right
things. 108 And we are continually expanding our knowledge about
what it really costs to provide an equal or adequate education for
children who live with the multidimensional disadvantages of
concentrated poverty. l0 9
However, just as Derrick Bell warned that integration is not
a panacea, it behooves us to temper any expectation that more
107. See generally FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 82.
108. See e.g., Ronald F. Ferguson & Helen F. Ladd, How and Why Money
Matters: An Analysis of Alabama Schools, in HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE:
PERFORMANCE-BASED REFORM IN EDUCATION 265 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996); Larry
V. Hedges et al., Does Money Matter? A Meta-Analysis of Studies of the Effects of
Differential School Inputs on Student Outcomes, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Apr. 1994, at
5. For helpful reviews of the literature, see DAVID GRISSMER ET AL., IMPROVING
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: WHAT STATE NAEP TEST SCORES TELL US (2000), and
COMM. ON EDUC. FINANCE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAKING MONEY MATTER:
FINANCING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (Helen F. Ladd & Janet S. Hansen eds., 1999).
Based on state-level data, Grissmer's study reported, "[o]ther things being equal,
higher per-pupil expenditures, lower pupil-teacher ratio in lower grades, higher
reported adequacy of teacher-reported resources, higher levels of participation in
public prekindergarten, and lower teacher turnover all show positive, statistically
significant effects on achievement." GRISSMER ET AL., supra, at 98. Grissmer also
writes:
The most efficient uses of educational expenditures among those evaluated
here were providing all K-8 teachers more-adequate resources for teaching,
expanding public prekindergarten in lower-SES states, and targeting
reductions in pupil-teacher ratios in lower grades in lower-SES states to
well below the national average and in medium-SES states to the national
average.
Id. at 99.
109. See William D. Duncombe & John M. Yinger, Performance Standards and
Educational Cost Indexes: You Can't Have One Without the Other, in EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, 260, 260 (Helen F.
Ladd et al. eds., 1999) (cost function for New York); Andrew Reschovsky & Jennifer
Imazeki, Achieving Educational Adequacy Through School Finance Reform, 26 J.
EDUC. FIN. 373 (2001) (cost functions for Texas and Wisconsin). For a review of
state-level cost studies, see ACCESS Project, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, A
Costing Out Primer (2005),
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource-center/costingoutprimer.php3.
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resources, even wisely spent, will fully close the educational gaps
between poor minority schoolchildren and their more wealthy
White peers. It would be remarkable-and inconsistent with a
large body of research1 0-if tangible resources alone could entirely
offset the complex and ineffable consequences of racial and
socioeconomic isolation. Our experience with Milliken II remedies
provides some evidence of this fact.' Similarly, although school
finance lawsuits have helped narrow spending inequalities
between districts,112 any hope that they will completely eliminate
the achievement gap "is bound to be disappointed" because
"[sichools, no matter how good, cannot carry the entire burden of
narrowing our substantial social class differences." 113
One concrete example of this lesson-and an instructive
doctrinal response-is the interplay between two educational
equity decisions of the Connecticut Supreme Court, Horton v.
Meskill 14 and Sheff v. O'Neill."15 Horton was an early school
finance case in which the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated
a property tax-based funding scheme under the equal protection
110. See GRISSMER ET AL., supra note 108, at 33-36; Christopher Jencks &
Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap: An Introduction, in THE
BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 1, 3 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds.,
1998); see also NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NAEP 1999 TRENDS IN ACADEMIC
PROGRESS: THREE DECADES OF STUDENT PERFORMANCE 38-39 (2000). Whereas the
Black-White gap on national achievement tests remains on the order of two-thirds
to four-fifths of a standard deviation, see Jencks & Phillips, supra, at 3, even the
most robust results of resource-oriented educational interventions show gains of
only one-fourth to one-half of a standard deviation, see, e.g., GRISSMER ET AL., supra
note 109, at 33-35 (discussing results from class size reduction experiments). This
contrast coheres with research findings, beginning with the Coleman Report in
1966, that emphasize the influence of peer effects and background social factors on
student achievement. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE
ACHIEVEMENT GAP (2004); see also RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW:
CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 48-58 (2001)
(collecting studies on peer influences).
111. In the predominantly Black Kansas City school district, for example,
despite over one billion dollars of investment under a desegregation plan that
increased per-pupil spending far above levels in the predominantly White
surrounding suburban districts, see Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 74-80, 99
(1995), minority student achievement remained "at or below national norms at
many grade levels," id. at 82 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
112. See William N. Evans et al., The Impact of Court-Mandated School Finance
Reform, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE, supra note 110, at 72,
87-90.
113. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 110, at 146.
114. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
115. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
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guarantee of the state constitution. 116  Declining to follow
Rodriguez,117 the court determined that large differences in local
revenue-raising capacity produced "significant disparity in the
quality of education" and that such disparity ran afoul of "the
requirement that the state provide a substantially equal
educational opportunity to its youth."11 8 In the ensuing years, the
legislature revised the funding scheme so that the neediest school
districts, including the predominantly poor and over 90% minority
Hartford public schools, would receive the most state aid. The
revised system produced its intended effect, as "overall per pupil
state expenditures in Hartford exceeded the average amount spent
per pupil in the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns" in the
1990-91 and 1991-92 school years. 119 Despite this allocation of
resources, however, "[t]he performance of Hartford schoolchildren
on standardized tests [fell] significantly below that of
schoolchildren from the twenty-one suburban towns."120
In the Sheff litigation, begun in 1989, the plaintiffs alleged
that "students in the Hartford public schools are burdened by
severe educational disadvantages arising out of their racial and
ethnic isolation and their socioeconomic deprivation."121 The
central issue was "whether the state has fully satisfied its
affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a substantially
equal educational opportunity if the state demonstrates that it has
substantially equalized school funding and resources."1 22 In a
novel ruling, the court held that, notwithstanding funding
equalization, "the existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation
in the public school system deprives schoolchildren of a
substantially equal educational opportunity and requires the state
to take further remedial measures." 123 An equal educational
opportunity, the court concluded, is one that is "free from
substantial racial and ethnic isolation." 124 In 2003, the parties
settled on a $245 million voluntary integration plan requiring the
116. See Horton, 376 A.2d at 374.
117. Id. at 371-73.
118. Id. at 374-75. Alluding to the misguided analysis in Rodriguez, the court
said, "[oJbviously, absolute equality or precisely equal advantages are not required
and cannot be attained except in the most relative sense." Id. at 376.
119. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1273.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1271.
122. Id. at 1281.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1286.
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construction of eight new magnet schools to attract suburban
White children to the urban center and a large expansion of
opportunities for urban minority children to attend suburban
public schools.1 25
As Professor James Ryan has observed, Sheff "sprang not
from the failure but from the success of earlier school finance
litigation."126  The case "represents an attempt to use
desegregation to overcome the inadequacies of school finance
reform."127 Indeed, what is significant about Sheff is that the court
did not find racial segregation problematic because of underlying
racial discrimination. 128 Instead, it found segregation problematic
for the same reason that it found unequal school funding
problematic in Horton-because of the "substantial disparities in
educational opportunities resulting from [it]."129 Thus, through
Horton and Sheff, the Connecticut Supreme Court managed to
achieve what the United States Supreme Court failed to achieve in
1973: a doctrinal synthesis of school desegregation and school
finance reform under a common principle of equal educational
opportunity. 130
As we move into Brown IIs next half-century, we would do
well to evolve more Sheffs and more synthesis in our law and
public policy on equal educational opportunity. Over thirty years
ago, the district court in Keyes recognized that neither
125. See Robert A. Frahm, Sheff Deadline 2007; Settlement: A Four-Year Effort
Begins to Help Undo Hartford's School Segregation, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 23,
2003, at Al; Paul von Zielbauer, Hartford Integration Plan to Add 8 City Magnet
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003, at B5. In 2004, the Sheff plaintiffs went back
to court to seek state compliance with the settlement timeline. See Stacey Stowe,
State Accused of Failure To Integrate In Hartford, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2004, at B6.
126. Ryan, supra note 10, at 538.
127. Id. at 532.
128. See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1285 ("Racial and ethnic segregation has a pervasive
and invidious impact on schools, whether the segregation results from intentional
conduct or from unorchestrated demographic factors.").
129. Id.; cf. Horton, 376 A.2d at 374 (invalidating school finance scheme because
"pupils in [low-wealth municipalities] receive an education that is in a substantial
degree lower in both breadth and quality than that received by pupils in
municipalities with a greater financial capability").
130. The California Supreme Court also achieved this synthesis in 1976 through
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (holding unequal school finance system
unconstitutional under state equal protection clause), and Crawford v. Board of
Education, 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976) (holding de facto racial segregation
unconstitutional under state equal protection clause). However, Crawford was
effectively overruled by a 1979 voter-initiated constitutional amendment limiting
the state's desegregation obligations to the requirements of the federal
Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
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compensatory resources nor desegregation alone could guarantee
equal educational opportunity. For poor and racially isolated
students, "the only feasible and constitutionally acceptable
program-the only program which furnishes anything
approaching substantial equality-is a system of desegregation
and integration which provides compensatory education in an
integrated environment."131 This is as true today as it was then.
Although the relative importance of redistributing students versus
redistributing resources will be a question for the ages, it would be
surprising if genuine equality of educational opportunity did not
ultimately require both.
131. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 90, 96 (D. Colo. 1970).
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